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IN DEFENSE OF THE BATTLE OF FORMS: CURING THE
"FIRST SHOT" FLAW IN SECTION 2-207 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 2-207' of the Uniform Commercial Code' has realistically extended
legal recognition to deals commercially considered closed even though the writ-
ings of the parties include additional or different terms. The effect has been
to undercut the common law concept of counter-offer and eliminate the "last
shot" doctrine: by submitting an acceptance varying from the terms of the
offer, the offeree could create a counter-offer such that if the parties then com-
pleted performance, the counter-offer would constitute the contract terms. This
"last shot" advantage allowed an offeree to battle for favorable contract terms
by submitting a printed form replete with favorable terms.
Section 2-207 removes this advantage, but its further attempt to define the
terms of this new category of contracts has produced an equally unacceptable
"first shot" doctrine: the first party to make an offer now has the advantage in
controlling the contract terms. This note will examine the judicial development
of section 2-207, analyze the "first shot" flaw, and suggest a cure which makes
the battle of the forms a commercially viable activity.
I. Legal Sanction to Commercial Deals
Section 2-207 concerns three contract formation situations: oral or informal
agreement, offer and acceptance, and conduct of the parties. Once a contract
has been formed between merchants, additional terms become part of the con-
tract unless they fall within one of the enumerated exclusions.
A. Contract Formation
1. Oral or Informal Agreement
If the parties reach an agreement orally or by informal correspondence,'
and either or both submit formal memoranda, a contract will be formed despite
1 Section 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confir-
mation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though
it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
2 Hereinafter referred to as the Code in the text and cited as U.C.C. in the footnotes.
3 See U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 1.
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the inclusion of different or additional terms.4 An agreement could arise from a
telephone order,5 meetings and negotiations,' or telex communications? A writ-
ten confirmation must satisfy the statute of frauds' and may be a letter of confir-
mation,' an acknowledgment,1" a confirmation of order,1 ' a telephone order
acknowledgment, 2 or exchanged purchase order and acknowledgment.' If
only one party submits a written confirmation, its additional terms which do
not materially alter the contract become part of it. On the other hand, if both
parties submit written confirmations, the contract consists of the terms in the
original agreement, the terms upon which the confirmations agree, and any addi-
tional terms which do not materially alter the contract' 4 This implies that if
the writings conflict on some point, neither party's term will be included in the
contract. Accordingly, a written confirmation should be submitted following
an informal agreement since it can be used offensively to impose non-material
additional terms and defensively to cancel conflicting terms in the other party's
confirmation. This situation represents a proper and acceptable battle of forms:
to introduce less significant terms and to rid the contract of any unbargained-for
subject matter which is in conflict.
An advantage of establishing a prior oral or informal agreement is that the
other party cannot submit a memorandum with additional or different terms
and make the contract conditional on assent to these terms. 5 If neither prior
agreement nor written confirmations can be properly established, there will be
a contract only if the parties have exchanged offer and acceptance or have by
their conduct recognized a contract.
2. Offer and Acceptance
A definite and seasonable acceptance of an outstanding offer creates a con-
tract even though it includes additional or different terms.'6 The offer usually
4 See American Parts Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154
N.W.2d 5 (1967).
5 Tidewater Lumber Co., Inc. v. Maryland Lumber Co., 3 UCO Rep. Serv. 351 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966).
6 Medical Development Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp.. 479 F.2d 345 '(10th Cir.
1973); see also Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
7 Th. van Huijstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 598 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
8 U.C.C. § 2-201. See, e.g., Southwest Engineering Co., Inc. v. Martin Tractor Co.,
nc , 205 Kan. 684, 473 P.2d 18 (1970) applying the three requirements of section 2-201:
the memorandum must evidence a contract for the sale of goods, be signed, and specify
quantity.
9 Th. van Huiljstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 598 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
10 Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
11 American Parts Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154
N.W.2d 5 (1967).
12 Tidewater Lumber Co., Inc. v. Maryland Lumber Co., 3 UCO Rep. Serv. 351 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966).
13 See Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206
N.W.2d 414 (1973).
14 U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 6.
15 Subsection (1) literally allows only an acceptance to be expressly made conditional.
The rationale is that where an informal agreement has already been reached, neither party
can obviate the agreement by requiring inclusion of subsequent terms.
16 See U.C.C., § 2-207(1), supra note 1.
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takes the form of a purchase order,"7 while the acceptance could be an acknowl-
edgment of an order,"8 an invoice, 9 or even a letter.' The use of a purchase
order and an acknowledgment will not place a contract in the offer-acceptance
category where the parties have already reached an agreement.2
At common law an offer by its nature limited acceptance to the terms
expressed in the offer. In section 2-207, "definite and seasonable" thus seems
strangely juxtaposed with "acceptance." Once it has been recognized, however,
that the word "acceptance" has been retained primarily to make use of the
familiar offer-acceptance categorization, then the words "definite and season-
able" in conjunction with "different" and "additional" function as guidelines in
expanding the concept of acceptance. Under section 2-207 the offeree may
create a contract and still introduce certain additional terms. An attempt to
expressly limit an acceptance to the terms of the offer now has no other effect
than to keep additional terms in the acceptance from becoming part of the con-
tract.
22
If the parties complete performance after exchange of offer and acceptance
and yet the acceptance failed to create a contract under subsection (1), either
by not being definite and seasonable or by expressly being conditional on assent
to additional or different terms, the contract will be recognized and its terms
determined under subsection (3). Rather than revert to the common law ap-
proach of treating the defective acceptance as a counter-offer, the courts have
properly kept the transaction within the framework of section 2-207 by applying
subsection (3) .2
3. Contract by Conduct
In the final contract formation situation, where the writings of the parties
fail to establish a contract, conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of a contract will be sufficient to establish one.24 Examples of insufficient writings
would be where an acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to its
additional or different terms,25 an offer is not accepted in writing,26 the buyer
and seller retain but do not sign the other's writing," or no informal agreement
is found or the writing fails as a written confirmation.28 Conduct recognizing
17 E.g., Matsushita Electric Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp., 284 N.E.2d 880 (Mass.
1972).
18 See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206
N.W.2d 414 (1973).
19 Silverstyle Dress Co. v. Aero-Knit Mills, Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 292 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1972).
20 Matsushita Electric Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp., 284 N.E.2d 880 (Mass. 1972).
21 See Southwest Engineering Co., Inc. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 473 P.2d
18 (1970).
22 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2) (a), supra note 1.
23 See U.C.C. § 2-207(3), supra note 1; American Parts Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration
Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967).
24 See Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1169 n.6 '(6th Cir. 1972).
25 See Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochemical, Inc., 334 F. Supp.
1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
26 See Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
27 Cf. American Parts Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich. App. 156, 154
N.W.2d 5 (1967).
28 See U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 7.
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a contract occurs where goods are shipped, accepted, and paid for2 9 and where
an offer is accepted by performance." Thus while the official comments give
no definition of "conduct," the courts have begun to establish a transactional
approach to the problem. The contract includes the terms on which the parties
agree and "any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provision"
of the Code. Since there seems little reason to exclude additional terms, "any
other provision" should include subsection (2) of section 2-207.
B. Additional and Different Terms
If a contract between merchants has been formed under subsection (1),
the additional terms become part of the contract unless excluded under sub-
section (2). Since a literal interpretation of subsection (2) would preclude dif-
ferent terms from ever becoming part of the contract, the distinction between
different and additional must be carefully drawn. While the official comments
set no guidelines, one court has accepted the following test: terms are additional
if they concern a subject matter not covered in the offer and different if they
alter subject matter already covered in the offer."
Some cases 2 and commentators s3 contend that subsection (2) should en-
compass "different" as well as "additional" terms, and one state has adopted this
approach in its enactment of the Code. 4 The official comments are ambiguous, 1
5
but anything other than a literal interpretation of the first sentence of subsection
(2) leads to an unmanageable or innocuous result. If a different term in the
acceptance could become part of the contract, the contract would thus contain
conflicting terms since nothing in section 2-207 deletes the variant term in the
offer. If it is suggested that notification of objection has already been given in
that the offer contains a conflicting term so as to excise the different term under
section 2-207(2) (c), then a different term in the acceptance could never be-
come part of the contract leaving little reason to include it in subsection (2).
While a simple and workable distinction has been drawn between additional
and different terms, a problem does arise as to how a term in the acceptance
which varies from a term implied by law, rather than expressly stated in the
offer, should be treated. In Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc.,6 the seller's acceptance in the form of an acknowledgment of order
contained a limitation of liability as to consequential damages. While the offer
29 Id.
30 See Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochemical, Inc., 334 F. Supp.
1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
31 See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206
N.W.2d 414 (1973). One party suggested the definition and the court indirectly accepted
it by stating no other basis for its designation of a term as "different."
32 See, e.g., id.
33 E.g., Note, 32 U. PrrT. L. Rsv. 209, 214 (1971).
34 Iowa Code Ann. § 554.2207 (1967).
35 U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 2: "Under this Article a proposed deal which in commercial
understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract. Therefore, any additional
matter contained in the confirmation or in the acceptance falls within subsection (2).. .. "
The specific omission here of different terms conflicts with U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 3:
"Whether or not additional or different terms will become part of the contract depends upon
the provisions of subsection (2). .. ."
36 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 '(1973).
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was silent as to consequential damages, the buyer claimed that they were implied
by law, thus making the term in the acceptance "different" rather than "addi-
tional," and consequently not a part of the contract. The court held that con-
sequential damages were implied terms which operated to make the limitation
of liability a different term.
The problem is that the approach taken in this case introduces more arti-
ficiality into the already fragile structure of section 2-207. A possible develop-
ment of the Air Products case might be that the offeree could never introduce a
term contrary to a Code provision unless expressly agreed to by the offeror. If
it is admitted that certain Code provisions are more fundamental than others,
the proper approach would be to prohibit a term implied by law from making
an acceptance term "different" and to consider the acceptance term as "addi-
tional" but subject to the material alteration test of section 2-207(2) (b)."
Arguably only those code sections without "unless otherwise agreed" provi-
sions would operate to make a variant term in the acceptance "different." Such
a distinction would be artificial because it implies that the mere inclusion of a
term by the offeree and the failure to object by the offeror constitutes an agree-
ment. At the very least, the suggestion that implied terms in the offer never
operate to make acceptance terms "different" would provide an offeree the cer-
tainty of knowing that only those of his terms which conflict with terms expressed
in the offer will absolutely never become part of the contract.
An additional term will not become part of the contract if the offer expressly
limits acceptance to the terms of the offer."8 This situation has arisen where a
purchase order stipulates that no change could be made in the order except by
a writing signed by the buyer,"9 irrespective of anything in the seller's form or of
the buyer's acceptance or payment."
Nor will additional terms become part of the contract if they materially
alter it.4 1 While the official comments do not specifically define material alter-
ation, they suggest three somewhat similar tests: whether the additional terms
materially change the bargain,42 whether the additional terms will result in sur-
prise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party,"3
and whether the additional terms involve an element of unreasonable surprise."
Some clarification is given by examples of clauses which are and are not material
alterations."5 Only a few courts have specifically relied on these tests.' Most
37 Support for this approach can be found in J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co., 7 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). The seller's formal acknowledgment of order provided
that the seller would not be liable for consequential damages. The court held that since
the buyer's order did not provide for damages, the exclusion of consequential damages could
not be considered inconsistent with the order.
38 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (a), supra note 1.
39 In re Tunis Manufacturing Corp., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972),
where such a stipulation defeated an arbitration clause in the acceptance.
40 See Application of Doughboy Industries, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488
(1962).
41 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (b), supra note 1.
42 U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 3.
43 Id., Comment 4.
44 Id., Comment 5.
45 Id., Comments 4 and 5.
46 See, e.g., Th. van Huijstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 598 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1972), where the court applied the "no element of unreasonable surprise" test.
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have focused on the commercial setting. For example, the most common addi-
tional term seems to be the arbitration clause; and, with one exception,"7 arbi-
tration clauses have been held to materially alter the contract." The courts are
split as to whether an additional term limiting liability is a material alteration; 9
but, somewhat understandably, an additional term waiving the Code has been
discarded."0 Additional terms requiring that goods be shipped immediately51
or that complaints be submitted within 14 days 2 have been included in the
,contract.
The determination of material alteration is a question of fact and the Courts
of Appeals in the Sixth 3 and Tenth" Circuits have correctly remanded cases
for determination of the material alteration question. Course of dealing and
7usage of trade should be given careful consideration.
55
Finally, additional terms do not become part of the contract if the other
party has already objected to them or does so within a reasonable time after
receiving notice of them.5" Conflicting terms in written confirmations thus pre-
vent inclusion of either party's term.5
II. The Flaw
Section 2-207 ostensibly put an end to the "battle of the forms" by abro-
gating the "last shot" doctrine. While it is realistic to recognize contract forma-
tion even if additional or different terms appear in the acceptance, section 2-207
has produced the unfortunate result of replacing the "last shot" doctrine with a
"first shot" doctrine. The first party to submit an offer now has the advantage
since none of his terms can be defeated by a conflicting term in the acceptance 8
thus allowing all of the terms of the offer to become contract terms. The "differ-
ent" acceptance term never becomes part of the contract, but the offeror's term
with which it conflicts does. The traditional "battle of the forms" continues
with the exception that the offeror now has the advantage.
47 See Silverstyle Dress Co. v. Aero-Knit Mills, Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 292 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1972). The seller's invoice for the sale of textiles included an arbitration clause.
The court impliedly held that since such clauses were customarily used in the trade, they would
not constitute a material alteration of the contract.
48 See, e.g., Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 101
Cal. Rptr. 347 '(1972) (the sale of yarn for the manufacturing of rugs); Trafalgar Square,
Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (without stating the
nature of the transaction); American Parts Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 8 Mich.
App. 156, 154 N.W.2d 5 (1967) (the sale of fabrics for manufacture into auto seat covers).
49 J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co., 7 UCC Rep. Sere. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970)
(limitation of liability as no material alteration). Contra, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
50 See Tidewater Lumber Co., Inc. v. Maryland Lumber Co., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 351
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
51 See Matsushita Electric Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp., 284 N.E.2d 880 (Mass.
1972).
52 Th. van Huijstee, N.V. v. Faehndrich, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 598 '(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
53 Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
54 Medical Development Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1973).
55 See U.C.C. § 1-205.
56 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (c), supra note 1; e.g., Silverstyle Dress Co. v. Areo-Knit Mills,
Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
57 U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 6.
58 The only recourse available to the offeree is to make his acceptance expressly condi-
tional on assent to its additional and different terms so as to make subsection (3) applicable.
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There seems little reason to favor one party over the other in the offer
and acceptance situation. The drafters of section 2-207 either did not recognize
this flaw or considered it a proper continuation of the common law rule that the
offeror is the master of his offer. If the latter is the case, it has no place within
the rationale of section 2-207; it is incongruous with this section's realistic deter-
mination of contract terms in the other two contract formation situations of
informal agreement followed by a written confirmation and contract by conduct.
The primary purpose of section 2-207 is to expand contract formation
situations and only incidentally to define what the terms will be. Accordingly,
there seems little reason to allow more than the skeletal terms upon which the
parties agree plus any additional terms which do not materially alter the con-
tract. Where a contract is established either by informal agreement followed
by written confirmations or by conduct recognizing a contract, neither party's
term on a point in disagreement will become part of the contract. This seems
quite reasonable in that if the parties do not bother to bargain for a term and
their writings later differ on it, neither should be given an advantage. In the
final situation where a contract is established by offer and acceptance, however,
this realistic determination of terms is abandoned. Even if the offer and accept-
ance differ on some point, the contract will include the offeror's term and ex-
clude the offeree's.
While it has been suggested that section 2-207 be redrafted,59 the "first
shot" flaw could be corrected by more frequent use of subsection (3). Since an
acceptance found not to be definite and seasonable'0 triggers the application of
subsection (3), a greater willingness on the part of the courts to hold an accept-
ance indefinite where the acceptance contains different terms would solve the
problem.
Subsection (1) allows an acceptance to create a contract even if it includes
additional or different terms; thus a term could not make an acceptance indefi-
nite simply by being different. However, unless an acceptance is to be effective,
irrespective of the magnitude by which a term differs from an offer term, the
nature of the different term in the acceptance must bear upon whether or not an
acceptance is definite. For example, if a written offer to buy goods indicated
that delivery must be made within two weeks and the seller's acceptance stated
that delivery would be made within two months, it would be foolish to hold that
the seller had made a definite acceptance and had interjected a "different"
term which would be dropped in favor of the buyer's delivery term. A more
reasonable response would be to say that the acceptance was not definite, that
the writings did not agree on time of delivery, and that the Code would supply
the delivery term.
The standard for "definite" would demand dual considerations: (1)
whether it would be commercially reasonable to assume that the offeree would
still consider his writing an acceptance if his "different" term were deleted and
59 Kove, "The Battle of the Forms": A Proposal to Revise Section 2-207, 3 U.O.C. L.J.
7 (1970).
60 See U.C.C. § 1-204(3) stating that an action is seasonable if taken at or within the
time agreed; or, if no time is agreed, at or within a reasonable time. Since timeliness has not




(2) whether recognizing the writing as a definite acceptance would give the
offeror an unbargained-for advantage. The standard of commercial reason-
ableness is a touchstone throughout the Code and would include such considera-
tions as course of dealing and usage of trade.61 Additionally, if the "different"
term were typed or written rather than being part of the printed form, it would
suggest added importance to the offeree.
Under this suggested approach, either party can ensure that no unbargained-
for subject matter will be included in the contract simply by inserting in his
writing a term negating the subject matter. For example, if one party does not
want disputes to be arbitrated, he simply says so in his writing. If the other
party's writing does not address arbitration, the first party's term will control.
On the other hand, if the other party inserts an arbitration clause, it would be
labeled "different" and neither party's term would become part of the contract.
Since the contract would then be silent as to arbitration, the party who wanted
to avoid arbitration has achieved his purpose and used his form to battle defen-
sively.
III. Conclusion
Section 2-207 has expanded contract formation situations by recognizing
deals commercially considered closed even though the writings include additional
or different terms. Unfortunately, this section's further attempt to determine
contract terms has effectively replaced the "last shot" doctrine with a "first shot"
doctrine. The traditional battle of forms whereby one party could gain an
advantage by using a printed form with its cluster of favorable terms has not
been eradicated. Neither party would have an appreciable advantage, however,
if the courts were more disposed to hold an acceptance indefinite where it in-
cludes "different" terms.
Buyers and sellers thrust their forms on each other. The suggested approach
encourages this battle of forms within a proper and more restrictive framework-
offensively to introduce non-material terms and defensively to ensure that un-
bargained-for subject matter will not become part of the contract.
John Henry Davis
61 See U.O.O. § 1-205.
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